by Alan McCombes
FOR SOCIALISTS, internationalism is a sacred principle. "The working man has
no country", declared the founder of scientific socialism.
Today, in the age of transnational capitalism and instantaneous world-wide
communication via telephone, satellite TV and the Internet, the existence of 184
separate nation states, each with its own national economy and state apparatus,
is a relic from an earlier technological stage. Even sections of the capitalist
class have now been forced to face up to the historical obsolescence of the
nation state by, for example, attempting to move towards European Monetary Union
(EMU) as a step to pan-European political union. Tory ex-Chancellor Kenneth
Clarke even committed the heresy of suggesting that, as a consequence of
European federal union, Westminster would eventually become the equivalent of "a
county council" – a statement which he later retracted for political reasons.
The brand of nationalism which preaches solidarity on the basis of race,
language, culture, geography is incompatible with socialism – which promotes
solidarity on the basis of class, irrespective of nationality, religion or
ethnic origin. These are elementary principles. But just as a child will never
learn to read and write simply by reciting by rote the letters of the alphabet,
socialists will never build a movement capable of overthrowing capitalism
without going beyond the ABCs of scientific socialism.
Karl Marx himself, who in words and deeds strove to unite the working class
across national borders, nonetheless supported the struggles of the Irish people
and the Polish people for independent nationhood. The victory of the Irish
people and the Polish people would strike a twin blow against British
imperialism and against the Tsarist empire, which in turn would open the
floodgates of revolution across Europe.
Later, in the early part of the twentieth century, Lenin was accused by
members of his own party of "nationalist-socialism" precisely because he
developed a programme on the national question which went beyond the repetition
of basic internationalist slogans.
It may appear out of place for a democratic socialist party operating in
Scotland in the 1990s to invoke the writings of Lenin in support of our
arguments. Following the disintegration of the totalitarian Stalinist states of
Eastern Europe, it has become fashionable to disparage Lenin as a despot who
introduced totalitarian rule into Russia. However, we reject the ill-informed
demonology of Lenin that passes for factual history in certain quarters. As
opposed to the authoritarian tyrant of academic mythology, Lenin led an
essentially peaceful revolution whose central aim was to bring about social,
economic and political democracy. His writings and speeches – before, during and
after the Russian Revolution – are saturated with the spirit of democracy, not
least of all on the national question.
Within a few years of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the centralised,
repressive and autocratic Tsarist state had been dismantled and replaced by a
highly decentralised structure. A genuinely democratic federation had begun to
take shape, within which, irrespective of their size, the various republics that
made up the federation were granted equal representation in the government.
Small nations which wished to secede were set free; new democratic republics
were established in territories which had known only vicious persecution;
smaller territories were granted varying degrees of autonomy. New nations were
created; new alphabets were even invented in order to facilitate the development
of national languages.
It was precisely over the national question that Lenin’s opposition to the
bureaucratic methods of Stalin finally erupted into open conflict. From his
deathbed, Lenin lambasted Stalin for his Great Russian chauvinism in his
dealings with the smaller nationalities and for his reckless and ill-informed
accusations of "nationalist-socialist" against the Georgian Bolsheviks. Stalin
in turn accused Lenin of "national liberalism".
Unfortunately, the death of Lenin paved the way for the rise to power of this
"Great Russian bully", as Lenin described him (notwithstanding Stalin’s Georgian
origins). This in turn led to the eventual suppression of democracy and national
rights in the USSR in violation of every principle of elementary socialism.
Although we live in a completely different society today from that which
confronted Lenin in the early part of this century, the basic method by which
Lenin approached the national question retains its validity today.
Long before the Russian Revolution, Lenin had recognised that the national
question presented an opportunity as well as a danger to the socialist movement:
"We would be very poor revolutionaries if, in the proletariat’s great war of
liberation for socialism, we did not know how to utilise every popular
movement against every single disaster imperialism brings". Writing in
1916 about the Easter Rising in Dublin, Lenin said: "To imagine that a social
revolution is conceivable without revolts by small nations in the
colonies and in Europe ... is to repudiate social revolution. So one army
lines up in one place and says ’We are for socialism’ and another, somewhere
else and says ’We are for imperialism’, and that will be a social revolution!
... Whoever expects a ’pure’ social revolution will never live to see
it.... The socialist revolution in Europe cannot be anything other than
an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all and sundry oppressed and
discontented elements." And while pointing out that, as a general rule,
socialists favour bigger, broader multi-national states, Lenin carefully added
the qualification: "other conditions being equal". (All italics are as in
the original text.)
As a general rule, Lenin and the Bolsheviks stood for "the right of nations
to self-determination". The leaders of the Polish Marxist movement, including
Karl Radek and the heroic revolutionary fighter Rosa Luxemburg, opposed this
formula as a "national-reformist" slogan. Fired with revolutionary
internationalist zeal and contemptuous of the narrow parochialism of the Polish
upper and middle classes, Rosa Luxemburg and her co-leaders of the Polish
Marxist movement went overboard in the opposite direction. In concentrating
purely on the class issues, they denied even the possibility of national
liberation. This in turn meant abandoning big sections of the working class to
the Polish Socialist party – in reality a nationalist party, socialist in name
only – whose leader Joseph Pilsudski went on to become fascist dictator of
Poland.
Replying to the criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg that his policy in favour of the
"right of nations to self-determination" would foment national divisions, Lenin
drew an analogy with human relationships and the right to divorce. Supporting
the right to divorce did not mean advocating that every marriage should be
dissolved, he argued.
However, Lenin’s argument has been interpreted in a one-sided manner,
particularly by some small pseudo-internationalist sects, who seem to believe
that the task of socialists is simply to counterpose international socialism to
demands for national independence irrespective of the circumstances. "Standing
for the right to divorce does not mean advocating divorce.... We are in favour
of a loving, voluntary union", declared one polemicist in a recent pamphlet
devoted to attacking Scottish Militant Labour on the national question. Of
course, we are in favour of "a loving, voluntary union". But when a marriage has
ceased to be "a loving, voluntary union" even the most optimistic marriage
guidance counsellor is sometimes forced to recommend divorce.
Indeed, Lenin illustrated his analogy by citing the example of the secession
of Norway from Sweden following an overwhelming referendum vote in favour of
independence by the Norwegian people. Rather than weakening links between the
working classes of the two nations, by removing the national resentment of
Norway towards its larger and more powerful neighbour, relations between the two
actually improved, Lenin argued.
Since then, the various independent countries of Scandinavia have evolved a
quasi-confederal relationship. There has been a long history of close
co-operation among the Scandinavian countries: for example, the labour movements
of the various countries campaign for common standards of welfare, wages, and
conditions. The workers’ parties and trade unions have regular joint
conferences. There is also throughout Scandinavia co-ordination of railway
timetables, roads, telecommunications, airlines and postal services – even
though the individual states remain politically independent of one another.
Ultimately, Lenin’s skilful and sympathetic policy on the national question
proved an unqualified success; in the smaller nations of the Tsarist empire,
tens of millions were inspired to support the Russian Revolution, seeing in the
Bolsheviks the most resolute defenders of the rights of national minorities.
There are sections of the British left today who simplistically equate
support for national independence with "nationalism". In fact, whether or not a
demand for national independence can be dismissed as "nationalist" depends upon
the answers to some crucial questions: "Who is raising the demand?" "Why are
they raising the demand?" "What will be the consequences?"
In 1934, when Spain was spiralling towards civil war, the exiled Russian
revolutionary leader and socialist internationalist Leon Trotsky called for the
working class in Catalonia to take power and declare an independent republic:
"Our comrades ... must agitate – through their own organisations and through the
Workers Alliance – for the proclamation of the independent republic of
Catalonia.... The proletariat must prove to the Catalan masses that it has a
sincere interest in the defence of Catalan independence." Trotsky anticipated
that if the working class of Catalonia took power, the reverberations would echo
throughout every corner of the Iberian Peninsula and pave the way for the
victory of socialism throughout Spain as a whole.
Later, in 1939, he called for "an independent Soviet Ukraine" – a breakaway
from the Stalinised USSR. "In order to draw together more closely and honestly,
it is sometimes necessary first to separate", he argued. "The national struggle,
one of the most labyrinthine and complex but at the same time extremely
important forms of class struggle, cannot be suspended by bare references to the
future world revolution." He went on to argue that "the triumph of the socialist
revolution on a world scale is the end-product of multiple movements, campaigns
and battles, and not at all a ready-made precondition for solving all questions
automatically". In Ireland, James Connolly played a leading role in the Easter
Rising, and declared that "the cause of labour is the cause of Ireland, the
cause of Ireland is the cause of labour".
In Scotland, John Maclean called for a Scottish Workers’ Republic in 1920 –
yet continued to call for one all-Britain industrial trade union, as opposed to
the plethora of small unions, including sixty purely Scottish trade unions.
While fighting for an independent socialist Scotland, Maclean even expressed the
conviction that over generations "inter-marriage will wipe out all national
differences and the world will become one."
Maclean raised his demand for an independent Scottish Workers’ Republic
because he believed that a war between Britain and the US was imminent – a view
shared at that time by many mainstream capitalist commentators based on the
growing trade war between the two imperialist powers. Although the revolutionary
struggles that had convulsed Clydeside in 1919 were matched by similar struggles
in Belfast and Liverpool, they had failed to ignite a general movement across
Britain as a whole. Maclean concluded that "Scotland was more ready for
socialism than England" and that it was possible to establish a Scottish
Workers’ Republic sooner rather than later – thus averting the horror of a new
world war.
On various counts, Maclean was to prove mistaken. War with America failed to
materialise. The idea of a Scottish Workers’ Republic fell largely on stony
ground. In contrast to Ireland, which had suffered centuries of oppression and
where national discontent had been a mighty revolutionary force, Scotland had
benefited from its involvement as a partner in the British empire, then still
one of the major powers in world capitalism. Maclean himself was left isolated
from the mainstream of the Scottish labour movement and without influence in the
emerging British Communist Party. There barely existed in Scotland at that stage
any significant support for national independence. Finally, the outbreak of a
revolutionary British-wide general strike within a few years of Maclean’s early
death revealed that the political gap between Scotland and England was narrower
than Maclean had estimated.
Nonetheless these were honest mistakes of a genuine revolutionary. The
position adopted by John Maclean on Scottish independence should neither be
opposed on principle – nor defended uncritically. A slogan or a policy may be
correct at one stage – but becomes redundant when conditions themselves change.
In one sense, Maclean was far in advance of his time: in the final years of
the twentieth century, the idea of an independent socialist Scotland has become
a much more attractive prospect for whole swathes of workers and youth. More
than ever before there is doubt over the future of the 300 year old Union
between Scotland and England. Just as decaying Stalinism proved incapable of
holding together the multi-national states of the USSR, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia, it is becoming more and more questionable whether decaying
capitalism can hold together the multi-national state that is the United
Kingdom.
Scotland has a distinctive history which sets it apart from Ireland and Wales
– both of which were conquered and subjugated by England in the middle ages. The
history of Ireland is a prolonged and bloodstained tale of national resistance
and murderous oppression. Wales, mainly as a result of its geographical
proximity to England, evolved in the opposite direction: migration in both
directions, intermarriage and the development of the Welsh economy by English
capital led to partial integration of the two countries; although there remains
in Wales a powerful sense of national injustice which is likely to grow rather
than diminish in the future.
Scotland, in contrast, successfully resisted English colonisation. The Wars
of Independence of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries succeeded in driving
out England and paved the way for the emergence of a Scottish national state
with its own indigenous ruling class and a separate national economy which
survived independently for more than 400 years.
The Scottish ruling class – which had brought Scotland to the verge of
financial ruination – surrendered political independence in 1707 in order to
gain access to English markets. For the English ruling class, a federal union or
partnership on a free and equal basis was unacceptable. While a degree of
independence was preserved in the spheres of law, education and religion,
Scotland was effectively turned into a dependent nation, stripped of political
or economic autonomy.
Like the treaty accepting the partition of Ireland signed by Michael Collins
in 1921, the Act of Union provoked widescale opposition. Eventually, with the
rise of the British empire, Scottish opposition to the Union began to dissolve.
For the Scottish ruling classes, the Union became synonymous with progress and
enlightenment. Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century and the
nineteenth century, those elements who opposed the Union were regarded in much
the same way as today’s Euro-sceptics are regarded by those sections of the
ruling class who look to Europe for salvation. With the upper classes and middle
classes prospering immensely from the plunder and pillage of the British empire,
the very concept of Scotland began to be regarded as a relic of a bygone age;
for a period, the Scottish establishment even began to drop the word "Scotland",
replacing it with the term "North Britain".
However, within radical circles and within the emerging labour movement there
remained a yearning for Home Rule, which in turn reflected the existence of an
anti-imperialist sentiment and an affinity with Ireland and the oppressed
nations of the empire. Thus the 1820 Weavers’ Insurrection – a forerunner of the
Chartist movement – demanded Scottish independence. Later the emerging labour
movement inscribed on its banner the demand for Home Rule. Keir Hardie’s
Scottish Labour Party, formed in 1888, included the demand for Home Rule as the
fifth point in an 18-point programme. The Scottish TUC, formed as a radical
breakaway from the British TUC in 1897, adopted a pro-Home Rule policy in 1914.
Later, the first act of the ten ILP MPs – the "Red Clydesiders" – who were
elected from the West of Scotland to Westminster in 1922 was to present a bill
to the House of Commons calling for Scottish Home Rule. At the same time, John
Maclean was agitating for a Scottish Workers’ Republic.
However, throughout this period there was never any serious mass movement in
favour of independence. Historically, the Union had been cemented by the rise of
the British empire. It was then galvanised by the sense of British identity
forged during two world wars. It was further reinforced by the post-war upswing
and the development of a Britain-wide welfare state and National Health Service;
and by the existence of a Britain-wide mass workers’ party proclaiming the goal
of a socialist Britain.
In more recent times, all of these factors have been turned upside down.
Britain, from being among the world’s super-powers, was long ago relegated from
the Premier League of world capitalism and continues to slide down the table.
For twenty years, the welfare state, the NHS and other public services have been
under attack. The Labour Party, once the mass party of the British working
class, is now openly aligned with big business. All of these ingredients have
contributed to a weakening of British identity and the search for a Scottish
solution to the social and economic problems of Scotland. This in turn has been
underpinned by the existence of North Sea oil, which from the late 1960s onwards
transformed the idea of Scottish independence from a romantic dream into a
practical economic possibility.
The Scottish National Party (SNP) has existed for just over sixty years. For
most of that time, it was regarded as a fringe party pursuing an impossible
fantasy. Only in 1964, exactly 30 years after the party was formed, did it break
through the 1% barrier to achieve 2% of the vote in Scotland. That year marked
the beginnings of the emergence of nationalism as a significant force for the
first time since the crushing of the Jacobite rebellion in 1745.
It coincided with the coming to power of a Labour government – the first for
thirteen years. Within two years, support for the SNP had more than doubled to
5% across Scotland. Four years later, in 1970, it had more than doubled again to
11%. Then four years later, in the general election of October 1974, the party
won a sensational 30% of the total vote in Scotland. Gripped by panic, the
Labour Party came out in favour of limited Scottish Home Rule – a policy which
it had jettisoned 25 years earlier.
For a combination of subjective and objective reasons the SNP failed to
maintain this momentum. One key factor was the political weakness of the SNP
leadership itself. Both in parliament and especially within local councils, the
party’s opportunistic wheelings and dealings with the Tory Party caused massive
damage to the standing of the SNP in the eyes of the working class. In Glasgow
and other parts of the West of Scotland, the right-of-centre, middle class,
Presbyterian image of the SNP ensured that its appeal would remain limited;
although when popular support for the Labour government began to plummet in
1976-7 the nationalists began to make massive inroads to the Labour vote even in
Glasgow.
However, even with a more capable leadership and a more radical image, the
SNP could not have led Scotland to independence at that stage for one simple
reason: there was no serious mood in favour of the break-up of the United
Kingdom. Throughout the 1970s, support for the SNP far outstripped support for
independence. In the years before Thatcher, support for independence barely
reached 15%; even many SNP supporters saw the party as a lever by which to exert
pressure on the Westminster parties for a better deal for Scotland.
Nonetheless, although the movement towards independence was still at an early
stage in the 1970s, the rise of the SNP did reflect a growing sense of Scottish
national identity. Twenty years on, that mood has hardened immeasurably. Support
for independence now significantly outstrips support for the SNP. Prior to the
general election a detailed opinion survey suggested that among DE voters (i.e.
the unskilled, semi-skilled and unwaged) independence was the most popular of
the three constitutional options then on offer (i.e. independence, devolution or
the status quo). Among 18-24 year olds, the independence option was more popular
than the other two combined. And among 18-24 year olds in the DE category, there
was a remarkable 32-point gap between support for independence and its closest
rival, devolution.
In the immediate aftermath of the general election, some political
commentators suggested that the growing political divergence between Scotland
and England had now been reversed. In contrast to the previous four general
elections, when Scotland had voted one way and England another, there was now a
political symmetry in voting patterns both sides of the border. The victory of
Blair in Scotland and in England signified a new political convergence and a
reversal of the trend towards independence. This analysis was shared by some
sections of the left, particularly by the Socialist Workers Party, who welcomed
an end to "the distraction of nationalism".
This analysis was entirely superficial and one-sided. In fact, the outcome of
the last general election has ensured that the national question will remain on
the boil for the foreseeable period. The complete wipe-out of the Tories in
Scotland; the marginalisation of the Liberal Democrats; the increased share of
the vote and number of seats won by the SNP: all of these factors combined mean
that electoral politics in Scotland has turned into a straight fight between
Labour and the SNP.
In England the Tories, albeit seriously weakened, remain the principle
opposition party with 150 MPs. While in some local areas of England a future
backlash against Labour can be channelled to the left including the Socialist
Party, the massed ranks of the middle classes are more likely to return to the
Tories – although a section will look to the Liberal Democrats as a slightly
more radical alternative to New Labour.
In contrast, the SNP has now replaced the Tory Party as the main rival to
Labour in Scotland. Even now, the party stands poised in second place in the
vast majority of Scotland’s 71 constituencies. In some areas, disillusionment
with New Labour can be partly channelled towards our organisation and to the
Scottish Socialist Alliance. But for the broad mass of the population, Scottish
politics will be viewed largely as a battle for supremacy between Labour and the
SNP. This fact alone is sufficient to ensure that the next four to five years
will see a growing gulf between Scottish and English politics. But the existence
of a Scottish Parliament, which will be elected within eighteen months and fully
operational within two years, adds an explosive new ingredient.
Other things being equal, the national Labour leadership would have preferred
to have buried the whole idea of a Scottish Parliament. Those ultra-left
grouplets who called for boycotts and No votes in the referendum are hopelessly
wide of the mark when they echo the claim of Blair and his spin doctors that the
setting up of a Scottish Parliament is all part of a New Labour masterplan to
reform and modernise the Union. In fact New Labour has drawn back from the
wide-ranging constitutional reform which the party was promoting before Blair
took over in 1994. Plans for regional assemblies in England have now been
jettisoned – even though in the Northern Region especially, which includes the
parliamentary constituencies of Blair and Mandelson, there appears to be a
growing demand for some form of regional assembly.
The real driving force for a Scottish Parliament has been the rising national
discontent in Scotland against centralised Westminster rule. For the New Labour
leadership, failure to deliver a Scottish Parliament would have spelled
catastrophe for the party in Scotland. The Scottish labour and trade union
movement would have split down the middle with a large breakaway grouping opting
for independence and perhaps even merging with the SNP.
It is clear that prior to the general election, sections of the national
Labour leadership had begun to explore the possibility of avoiding or at least
diluting the party’s decades-long commitment to an elected Scottish Parliament.
The decision to call a double-question referendum was an expression of Labour’s
weakening commitment to devolution. Clearly, if the outcome of the general
election had been different, with, for example, the Tories remaining Scotland’s
second party, the Labour leadership would have had more room to manoeuvre. At
the very least, it is likely that sections of the Labour leadership, including
individuals like Jack Straw, would have been encouraged to express open
scepticism towards the idea of a Scottish Parliament in order to muddy the
waters. But the replacement of the Tories as Scotland’s second party by the SNP
ensured that the heat was turned on Labour to deliver its full election pledge.
In that sense, the New Labour leadership has acted like an employer who awards a
wage increase to his workforce to avert a strike – while trying to dress it up
as an act of generosity.
Moreover, when an employer makes concessions to his workforce under pressure,
that does not provide a permanent resolution of class conflict; it serves
invariably to strengthen the confidence of the workers and encourages them to
come back for more in the future. Similarly, the granting of a limited Scottish
Parliament will fuel the national question rather than extinguish it.
It is instructive to compare the No campaign in the recent referendum with
the anti-devolution campaign conducted in 1979. Then, there were two distinct
strands to the campaign.
On the one hand, there was a vein of class opposition to a Scottish assembly
based on the proposition that such a reform would be a distraction from the
central mission of bringing about a socialist Britain. Although it was a
mistaken position, it nonetheless found an echo – particularly among some of the
more class conscious socialist-leaning workers. The complete absence of this
argument this time round reflects the weakening of the broad socialist movement
on an all-Britain scale since 1979; today, even the most politically conscious
workers and youth regard the idea of a socialist Britain as a remote prospect
and are more inclined to look for a Scottish road to socialism.
The second strand of the No campaign in 1979 consisted mainly of businessmen
and Tory activists who argued that a Scottish assembly would be a useless and
expensive additional tier of bureaucracy – the same type of arguments which
dominated this year’s referendum campaign in Wales. In 1979 the Tories
deliberately conveyed the impression that they stood for something stronger than
the assembly on offer from Labour. There was no serious suggestion in 1979 that
a Yes vote would be the first step towards the break-up of the Union. Indeed in
1979 the ultra-unionist Orange Order backed Labour’s devolution proposals –
which at that stage was in line with their support for the restoration of a
Stormont-type parliament in Northern Ireland. In contrast, in the recent
referendum, the Orange Order vehemently supported a No, No vote on the grounds
that a Scottish Parliament would lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom –
which of course would have potentially serious repercussions for Northern
Ireland.
Nor was the Orange Order a voice crying out in the wilderness: the central
theme of the entire No, No campaign was defence of the Union. "As sure a
chrysalis turns into a butterfly, a parliament in Edinburgh will lead to a
Scotland that is separate from the rest of the UK", warned Labour’s Tam Dalyell.
In one televised debate, Scots-born Bruce Anderson, editor of the right-wing
Spectator magazine, poured scorn on Labour government minister George
Robertson, when he compared a devolved Scotland with a US state or a German
Land: "Scotland is neither an American state nor a German Land; it is a nation
with its own history and identity. As soon as you put a parliament in a nation
such as Scotland, it becomes a focal point." In other words, for the forces of
conservative reaction, it would be more acceptable to site a parliament in
Newcastle or Birmingham – because this would represent less of a threat to the
United Kingdom.
Other Labour politicians have pointed to the example of Catalonia as an
example of a stable, devolved parliament within a multi-national state. Unlike
the German Länder, which were artificial creations imposed from the outside by
the major powers after the Second World War to prevent the re-emergence of a
strong centralised German state, Catalonia is clearly a distinct nation within
the Spanish state.
Of course, there are important differences between Catalonia and Scotland –
including the history of cultural and national oppression suffered by Catalonia
under Franco. But in other respects, the national question in Catalonia is less
developed than in Scotland. In terms of its history, geography and population
mix, the national question in Catalonia bears closer comparison to Wales than to
Scotland. As in Wales, the Catalan language has played a significant role in the
development of national consciousness. However, while the language question can
help to fuel national sentiment, it can also be a source of division. In
Scotland the weakness of the Gaelic language means that national consciousness
does not have the same cultural or ethnic dimension – which paradoxically has
helped broaden the appeal of nationalism and independence.
It is also the case that Catalonia is the major economic powerhouse of the
Iberian Peninsula. Barcelona is the biggest and busiest port on the
Mediterranean. Whereas Scotland has traditionally exported its population to the
more prosperous south east of England, Catalonia acts as a magnet attracting
labour from the poverty-stricken regions of southern Spain. The Basque Country
is also among the most prosperous regions of Spain, with a third of its
population made up of incoming migrants from Andalusia, Extramadura and other
economically backward regions. Although there are huge economic disparities
within Scotland, with cities like Edinburgh and Aberdeen enjoying relative
prosperity, the West of Scotland especially bears closer comparison to the
impoverished peripheral regions of southern and western Spain.
It is also clear that in neither Catalonia nor the Basque Country has the
establishment of an autonomous parliament undermined nationalism. In 1977, in
the first elections to the Basque parliament, support for the Basque nationalist
parties surged from 35% in the previous general election to 65%. The mainstream
nationalist party, the PNV, is at this stage content to control an autonomous
parliament which retains 93% of all taxes within the country, sending just 7% of
its revenues to Madrid as its contribution to defence and foreign affairs. Even
then, there is substantial support in the Basque Country for complete
independence – although the methods of individual terrorism employed by ETA, the
military wing of the main pro-independence party, Herri Batasuna, have repelled
many Basques. Meanwhile in Catalonia, the nationalist Catalan Convergencia has
become far and away the most powerful political force.
In neither Catalonia nor the Basque Country are the major nationalist parties
demanding full independence at this stage. That is partly a consequence of the
relative prosperity of both areas as compared with the rest of Spain. However,
as the crisis of European capitalism deepens, other nationalist parties –
including the main Catalan and Basque parties and Plaid Cymru in Wales – could
follow in the footsteps of the SNP and demand full national independence within
the European Union.
Until the recent referendum, public opinion in Scotland was broadly divided
three ways. Even then, the issues were blurred. Many people supported the
general principle of Home Rule with an open-minded attitude on whether it should
take the form of devolution or independence. In fact, prior to the referendum,
opinion polls showed that a clear majority of Scots expected that devolution
would eventually lead to independence. During the referendum campaign both the
Tories and the SNP, from diametrically opposing standpoints, maintained that a
devolved parliament in Edinburgh would be the first step on the road to
independence. For the majority of the population, the claim by the Labour
leadership that devolution would strengthen the Union cut little ice. In the
aftermath of the referendum, the temperature on the national question has almost
visibly risen. Flagmakers, for example, report that they have been working flat
out to cope with the demand since 11 September – and the demand is not for Union
Jacks.
With devolution about to become the status quo, the constitutional battle in
Scotland will begin to focus much more clearly on what form Home Rule should
take – devolution or independence? The SNP is already brimful of optimism. Even
though they were disappointed by their failure to win the Paisley South
by-election, the nationalists have drawn comfort from the fact that if the swing
from Labour to the SNP in Paisley were to be repeated on a national scale, the
SNP would come within one percentage point of Labour in a Scottish-wide
election. With Labour just six months into government at the time of the Paisley
by-election – albeit shaken locally by sleaze and corruption scandals – the
nationalists are now licking their lips in anticipation of a huge groundswell of
disaffection flooding in their direction over the next two to three years.
Elsewhere, we have explained in detail the woeful shortcomings of Labour’s
devolution scheme. One figure alone provides a glimpse of the storms and
stresses that lie ahead for Labour in Scotland: as part of the government’s
overall attack on public expenditure throughout the UK, the Scottish Office
budget will have been reduced by £1.2 billion a year by the year 2000, the first
year of operation of the new parliament. In other words there will be £240 less
spent per head of the population in 1999 than is currently spent. Moreover this
figure is based on an relatively (and unjustifiably) optimistic economic
forecast for the next three years.
If the British economy slides into a deep recession or slump within the next
three years, with mounting unemployment, plummeting tax revenues and an
escalating social security bill, even this figure will prove wildly optimistic.
Nor does the figure take into account future attacks on the Barnett formula
which provides Scotland with an extra £871 per head public expenditure compared
with England, to take account of geography, climate, worse health, lower levels
of home ownership, lower levels of private education and higher levels of
poverty. Even now, there are reports of English Labour MPs furiously demanding
that Scotland be brought into line with England – a campaign which is possibly
being orchestrated from behind the scenes by Labour spin doctors as part of a
softening up exercise to pave the way for a future assault on Scottish public
expenditure. All of this will provide meat and drink for the SNP to feast itself
upon. The party is now single-mindedly focused on the first elections for the
new Scottish Parliament in the spring of 1999. For the SNP, the road to
independence now appears less cluttered than ever before.
In the past the SNP’s stated aim was to win a majority of Scottish seats in a
general election to the Westminster Parliament – which the party would then
interpret as a mandate to call a referendum on independence. However, the
combination of the first-past-the-post electoral system, the uniform
geographical distribution of SNP votes, and the inevitable public focus on
British issues during Westminster elections rendered the SNP’s task extremely
difficult. In contrast, the prospect of an SNP majority in elections to a
Scottish Parliament appears much more viable. Already, even before the honeymoon
has turned sour, opinion polls indicate that the gap between Labour and the SNP
in the first elections to the new parliament will be significantly narrower than
in the general election. With these elections just eighteen months away, and
almost certain to be conducted under the Additional Member System, it is
unlikely that the SNP – or any other single party – will gain an outright
majority. But it is clear that the SNP are looking further ahead towards the
year 2003.
That is, of course, only one possible perspective. Indeed, events rarely
unfold in such a linear fashion. Real life is invariably less straightforward;
unforeseen circumstances usually intervene to complicate matters. Nonetheless,
that prognosis – the mirror opposite of New Labour’s dream of a modernised,
prosperous United Kingdom in which national antagonisms will wither away – is
likely to prove a more accurate projection of the future.
What processes could intervene to cut across the rise of the SNP and the
momentum towards independence?
In the past, the strength of the labour and socialist movement on an
all-Britain scale acted as a powerful counterweight to separatist tendencies. So
too did the existence of mighty trade unions waging Britain-wide battles for
better living standards and working conditions. On the other hand, it would be
wrong to have an exaggerated or one-sided conception of the relationship between
socialism, industrial struggle and the national question. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, a period of dramatic class conflict across Britain, the SNP itself
experienced a phenomenal growth in membership and electoral support. Certainly,
the strength of the Labour left and simultaneous Britain-wide movements against
the Tories, notably the miners’ strike of 1984-5, helped to reduce the appeal of
the SNP for workers and youth during the early to mid-1980s. This in turn helped
reinforce the serious financial and membership crisis which gripped the SNP
during these years. However, there were also subjective reasons for the
marginalisation of the SNP in this period. The demoralisation of the rank and
file following the failure of the 1979 referendum, the bitter internal conflict
which engulfed the party, and the crass stupidity of the party’s then leadership
all contributed to the SNP’s banishment to the wilderness.
Today, the political terrain is markedly different from the period 1979-87.
In the first place, the balance of forces between socialism and nationalism has
been dramatically reversed. The ideological impact of the collapse of Stalinism,
the repeated defeats inflicted on the trade union movement by Thatcher, the
withering away of reformism and social democracy internationally in the harsh
economic environment of the late twentieth century, and the cowardly desertion
to the camp of free market capitalism by a whole generation of labour and trade
union leaders, have together led to the severe weakening of the active forces of
socialism in Scotland and throughout Britain. In contrast, the SNP with 200
councillors, five MPs and a multi-million budget is in far healthier shape than
in the mid-1980s. However, it should be noted that the influence of the SNP is
not yet reflected in the existence of a mass active base; in many areas,
especially in the more run down working class areas, SNP activists remain thin
on the ground.
It is likely that the active base of the SNP will tend to expand in the
period running up to the Scottish parliamentary elections in 1999. The forces of
socialism, including our own organisation and the Scottish Socialist Alliance,
can also grow in this period. However, without a major realignment of the left,
involving substantial sections of the labour and trade union movement
affiliating to – or uniting with – the Alliance, the SNP will continue to
provide the main opposition to New Labour across Scotland as a whole.
Is it possible that a bigger, broader socialist force could emerge in
Scotland in the next three to four years as opposition to the government begins
to mount? Or for that matter, is there any likelihood of a substantial socialist
opposition emerging from or within the SNP? And what effect will future trade
union struggles in Scotland and across Britain have upon Scottish politics?
It would of course be an impossible task to chart out in detail the future
course of events in Scotland. In the mid-1980s it appeared on the face of it
that Scottish nationalism was a spent force. Yet by the late ’80s the SNP had
made a spectacular comeback. The Govan by-election in 1988 marked a turning
point; even though there have been – and will continue to be – ebbs and flows,
the tide has generally flowed towards independence ever since. By the same
token, socialism itself will also experience a dramatic revival in the next
period. But whereas in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the broad movement for
socialism in Scotland stood in direct opposition to national independence, that
is unlikely to be the case in the future. It is more likely that trade union and
socialist struggle will unfold as part and parcel of a wider struggle for
national independence.
With the break-up of the big nationalised industries, which provided the
framework for most of the united Britain-wide trade union struggles of the
1960s, ’70s and ’80s, it is likely that industrial conflict will tend to take a
more fragmented form in the next period.
For a whole generation of workers, class consciousness was forged in the heat
of big national industrial battles. Miners, power-workers, dockers, firefighters,
railworkers, health workers, local authority workers, steel workers and postal
workers were all involved at different stages in simultaneous mass strikes
across Britain. In contrast, struggles in the private sector tended to be more
localised: car workers in the West Midlands, shipyard workers on Clydeside and
Tyneside, print workers in London, etc. That is not to say there was no national
industrial action in the private sector; nor does it preclude national action in
the future in the private and public sectors. In the 1920s, the trade union
movement was if anything even more fragmented than today; yet in 1926 the
General Strike drew together a movement of millions across Britain in defence of
the miners. However, in the pre-war period national industrial movements tended
to be the exception rather than the rule. It was in the post-war era, especially
in the 1960s and 1970s, with the growth of public services and nationalised
industries, that the pattern of industrial conflict began to shift towards
British-wide movements. But today, after fifteen years of privatisation combined
in some cases with the virtual destruction of entire national industries, that
pattern is likely to change.
Even in the public sector, the existence of a Scottish Parliament which will
set wages and conditions in the NHS, in local authorities, in the fire service,
in public transport, etc, means that the focus of future trade union action in
Scotland will be on Edinburgh rather than London. The exceptions are the Post
Office and national departments of the civil service, including the Benefits
Agency and the Employment Services. Other public sector workers will be brought
more closely into line with teachers – who, because of Scotland’s separate
educational system, have always negotiated wages and conditions separately. That
is the main reason why the Educational Institute of Scotland remained as one of
the few completely separate Scottish trade unions. Despite these changes,
socialists have a responsibility to resist any attempts to split the trade
unions along national lines. With the growing trend towards some kind of
European super-state – which may, or may not, come unstuck – we have to promote
the case for wider pan-European structures to co-ordinate international trade
union action in defence of living standards, working conditions and public
services. We also have to defend the existence of British-wide trade union
structures.
At the same time, we should stand for greater autonomy of the trade union
movement within Scotland – a demand which is likely to arise within individual
trade unions as a means of breaking the bureaucratic stranglehold of the
national trade union leadership. In 1988, when the demand for mass non-payment
of the Poll Tax was being debated in the Labour Party, a number of trade unions
in Scotland supported the call – but were bludgeoned into line by the
leadership, who invoked conference and national committee decisions to prevent
their Scottish regions supporting radical action. Similar attempts by the
national trade union bureaucracy in the future to block industrial action in
Scotland would almost inevitably provoke a backlash among Scottish members. Our
organisation should not oppose demands that may arise in the future for greater
autonomy. While defending the unity of the trade union movement and resisting
any future nationalist attempts to divide trade unions along national lines, we
should also oppose the existing bureaucratic centralised structures and support
moves for greater democracy and local control.
Current battles being fought out in the Labour Party between Blairite
centralisers and Scottish autonomists could foreshadow similar battles in the
future within the trade union movement. Within the Scottish Labour Party,
traditional left-right divisions are increasingly spilling over into the
national question. Although there are individual exceptions to the general rule,
the supporters of Blair and the party leadership are also the most fervently
unionist and centralist in their approach to the national question. Conversely,
the opponents of Blairism within the labour and trade union movement in Scotland
are generally those who favour an autonomous Scottish Labour Party and, in some
cases, closer links with the SNP.
In his recent document, Scottish Labour’s former deputy general secretary,
Tommy Sheppard, offers a taste of the divisions to come. He calls for a separate
Scottish Labour Party, with its own constitution and policies. "In time, the
Scottish people will want their parties home grown, and Labour will have to
change or leave the political stage to others", he warns. Such talk is
tantamount to mutiny in the new Stalinised Labour Party.
It is clear that any future split within the Scottish labour and trade union
movement will encompass the national question as well as division over economic
and social policy. Given the inevitable conflict that will erupt between
Scotland and London under Labour’s new devolved parliament, it is highly likely
that any Scottish breakaway would either immediately embrace the cause of
independence, or rapidly evolve in that direction.
Any sizeable breakaway is likely to be preceded by a series of smaller
schisms, some of which may move towards the SNP, others perhaps gravitating
towards the Scottish Socialist Alliance. Further down the road, within a three
to five year period, the entire political map of Scotland could be completely
redrawn – with for example the creation of a new mass left formation embracing
sections of the existing SNP and Labour left, sections of the trade union
movement and the Scottish Socialist Alliance, with new nationalist and unionist
realignments on the right.
In the wake of the referendum, a section of the Tory right – backed by the
Scotsman and its editor-in-chief Andrew Neil – has shifted from an
uncompromising unionist stance to a quasi-federalist position. They call for the
Scottish Parliament to be provided with the same type of fiscal powers as the
Basque Parliament, which controls most of its own revenues and sends a small
portion to Madrid to pay for its share of expenditure on defence, foreign
affairs, etc.
Meanwhile the SNP has come out strongly in favour of EMU. Although the party
is still positioned to the left of Labour on many social issues, including
tuition fees, benefits to 16 and 17 year olds and Trident, it has nonetheless
gradually dropped some of the socialist rhetoric of the recent past. Former
deputy leader Jim Sillars has even attacked Alex Salmond as a Blairite-type
figure lacking "depth or political philosophy ... a man who could don the mantle
of socialism while advancing his political career then shed it as soon as it
became inconvenient".
Although Sillars himself has turned into a bitter nationalist fundamentalist,
there is truth in his criticisms. Salmond is a political opportunist who will
zig-zag in different directions depending upon which way the wind appears to be
blowing. During the economic recession of the early 1990s, Salmond repeatedly
described himself as a "socialist" and conveyed the impression that the SNP
stood far to the left of Labour. In the future, as a new and probably deeper
recession engulfs the economy, paralleled by a new and stronger surge to
socialism, Salmond could steer the SNP even further to the left than before.
But, at this stage, the SNP has drawn closer to the Liberal Democrats. The
SNP’s policy of wholehearted support for EMU is in line with this new strategy
of a rapprochement with the Liberal Democrats. For the SNP, a single European
currency would undermine many of the arguments against an independent Scotland.
The fact that the bulk of Scottish trade is with England; the importance of the
Scottish financial sector which again is heavily involved in English markets;
even the threat that independence will mean visitors to and from England having
to change currency at the border: all of these arguments have been deployed
against independence.
The idea of an independent Scotland within a federal or quasi-federal Europe
marks a further departure by the SNP from the ideal of pure independence. Under
EMU, national governments will lose all powers over monetary and exchange rate
policy; even fiscal powers are likely to be severely restricted. However, the
Liberal Democrats would be much more open to this version of independence. The
formal position of the Lib Dems is for a federal Britain and a federal Europe.
But if EMU is established and the British government maintains its policy of
delaying entry into EMU until after the next general election, the Scottish
Liberal Democrats could swing towards the SNP’s policy of a Scottish state
within a much more integrated European Union.
All of these shifts and turns illustrate the big changes that are now
underway in Scottish politics. For decades, the lines of division on the
national question appeared clear cut: the Tories stood for the status quo, the
SNP for independence, Labour and the Liberal Democrats for devolution. But the
shattering of the Scottish Tory Party in the general election and the subsequent
referendum rout of what was left of the hard-line unionist rump has launched
Scottish politics into previously uncharted waters.
For socialists the struggle for national rights can never be elevated over
and above the struggle for workers’ power and socialism. During the 1970s and
1980s our organisation opposed the demand for Scottish independence; although we
supported the right of the Scottish people to self-determination, and actively
promoted the demand for an autonomous parliament within an all-Britain
framework. That policy flowed from a perspective – justified at that stage –
that the struggle for socialism in Scotland would be inextricably linked with
the struggle for socialism throughout Britain as a whole.
A series of changes from the late 1980s onwards forced us to revise that
policy. In early 1995, in recognition of these changes, we adopted the policy of
a voluntary socialist federation of Britain on a free and equal basis. However,
we did not specify the exact route by which such a formation was likely to be
achieved. We left open several possibilities: either the working class taking
power in Britain and creating a decentralised federal structure; or,
alternatively, the existing British state being broken up along national lines
with Scotland moving at a separate pace towards socialism – leading in turn to a
new socialist realignment in the future.
But now, for reasons charted out in this document, it is clear that the
national question will be central to the struggle for socialism and workers’
power in Scotland. That is not to argue for a stages theory of socialism: first
fight for Scottish independence, then after achieving independence the struggle
for socialism can commence. It is to argue that national independence should now
be explicitly incorporated into our overall socialist programme. In place of the
open-ended slogan "For a socialist Scotland", we should now state clearly that
we are in favour of an independent socialist Scotland, as a step towards a wider
socialist federation or confederation of European states. Whether or not we
should retain the slogan of a socialist federation of Britain requires further
discussion for several reasons.
First, because this formula excludes Ireland. If anything, family, social,
historical and cultural links between Scotland and Ireland, North and South, are
stronger than between Scotland and England, or between Scotland and Wales. If
anything, the slogan of a socialist federation of Scotland, England, Ireland and
Wales would be more appropriate. And secondly, the formula of "an independent
socialist Scotland within a socialist federation of Britain" is guaranteed to
cause confusion. The meaning of the term "federation" is itself unclear to most
people. The Liberal Democrats say they are in favour of a federal Britain;
Germany describes itself as a "Federal Democratic Republic"; the USA also
proclaims itself a federation. Consequently, most people’s conception of a
federation is not of an alliance or association of independent states, but of a
more highly developed form of devolution. Instead of clarifying our policy on
the national question, the demand for a socialist federation of Britain will be
seen as contradictory and confused and would provide the SNP with a stick with
which to beat us.
The other dimension that we now have to take into account is Europe. Surveys
show that younger people regard themselves as "Scottish" first and "European"
second – with "British" trailing a poor third. This is in contrast to the
attitude of the generation which grew up in the 1930s and 1940s, when Britain
appeared as a bulwark of civilisation and democracy against the dark and
dangerous continent of Europe which had fallen under the jackboot of fascism and
sided with Hitler in World War II. But for a new generation of Scots, being part
of Europe appears a more attractive proposition than being part of Britain.
Paradoxically, the European dimension is undoubtedly a major ingredient in
the recent wave of support for independence. On the surface at least, Europe has
appeared more progressive on issues such as social policy and workers’ rights
than Britain, with its increasing drift towards US-style politics, economics and
social policy. At the same time, with moves towards closer European union, the
United Kingdom itself has begun to appear more and more superfluous – an
additional tier of government which acts as a political barrier separating
Scotland from the wider European formation.
The SNP have seized upon the European dimension as a means of counteracting
the narrow, separatist image that bedevilled the party in the past. But for most
people – especially younger people – that changing attitude towards Europe flows
in essence from a healthy internationalist instinct. The imperialist jingoism of
the Tory right wing has acted as a further stimulus to the growth of
pro-European sentiment among some of the most progressive and radicalised
sections of the working class, the middle class and the youth.
On the other hand, if the project of European Union begins to unravel, and
that political breakdown is accompanied by a resurgence of right-wing
nationalism and neo-Nazism in Germany, Italy, France and other parts of Europe,
there could be a recoil back in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, we have to
explore more carefully the European dimension and whether to lay greater
emphasis on the idea of a socialist Scotland within a socialist Europe, with
additional Scandinavian-style co-operation between Scotland, England, Ireland
and Wales through a formal alliance.
An additional issue we may have to address more seriously in the future is
anti-English nationalism. At this stage, it is mainly a problem in certain rural
communities in the Highlands and in the South of Scotland. In the cities,
anti-English sentiment is much more muted and tends to be channelled into banter
or into sporting rivalry. Consequently it may appear relatively harmless
compared with the problems of racism and especially of sectarianism which are
more serious divisive at this stage.
Nonetheless, there could easily emerge in the future much stronger, organised
currents of right-wing anti-English nationalism. There are sections of the SNP
who could move in that direction under the impact of severe economic recession
and growing social and national tensions. It should also be acknowledged that
there are other sections of the SNP who have no truck with anti-English
sentiment: for example, SNP trade unionists who have built solidarity links with
the Liverpool dockers and would tend to regard themselves as internationalists
who support independence rather than as nationalists.
As part of any move towards a more overtly pro-independence policy, it is
essential that socialists simultaneously adopt a more hard-line stand in
opposition to anti-English sentiment. Although it may appear like harmless
rivalry at this stage, this form of national chauvinism could in the future
assume a much uglier character if it is not combated by the socialist left.
At the same time we have to recognise that anti-English sentiment is not
straightforward racism. Its roots lie in the unequal relationship between the
two countries, and the existence of Scotland as a historically dependent nation
whose economic, political and social policy is determined elsewhere. The
emergence of a devolved parliament is likely to aggravate anti-English
nationalism by heightening tensions between Edinburgh and London over the
question of powers, funding, etc. Paradoxically, a fully independent Scotland
would have the opposite effect: Scotland’s problems could no longer be
simplistically blamed on England, or the English.
Why is it now necessary to make this programmatic change? Would it not be
preferable to retain a more open-ended policy on the national question? And
would we not be left high and dry if the momentum for independence were to run
out of steam and perhaps become submerged under a new tidal wave of socialist
struggle at an all-Britain level? These are legitimate doubts that will
inevitably be raised as part of this policy debate. But first we have to
recognise that whatever policy we arrive at will not be set in stone. For
socialists, the national question is essentially a strategical question.
British unionists and Scottish nationalists are mirror images of one another;
their central mission is respectively to defend or to dissolve the union. But
for socialists, the national question is less clear cut.
For example, for a period during the 1970s, Britain appeared to be lurching
towards social revolution. The Tory government under Edward Heath was broken by
the National Union of Mineworkers – a victory for the working class and the left
which marked the climax of a dramatic and turbulent chapter in British
industrial history. The new Labour government which took power declared its
intention to "bring about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of
wealth and power in favour of working people and their families". The ruling
class secretly hatched plots involving sections of the security services and the
media. Private armies were constructed to act as a bulwark against the threat of
social revolution. In the eyes of some sections of the ruling class, capitalism
was doomed.
Against that background a section of the ruling class in Scotland, including
the brewing magnate Colin Tennant, the retail millionaire Hugh Fraser and the
merchant banker Angus Noble, swung behind the SNP. For a period, the idea of an
independent capitalist Scotland, awash with revenues from North Sea oil,
appeared to offer an escape route: an oasis of prosperity and stability in
contrast to the social battlefield that was Britain in the early and mid-1970s.
Even then, there were some voices calling for an independent socialist Scotland.
But for most socialists and trade unionists, the battle for a new society was
being waged at an all-Britain level and the idea of an independent socialist
Scotland appeared an irrelevant diversion.
An exact re-run of the type of industrial movement that unfolded across
Britain in the early 1970s is not immediately on the horizon. Social processes
never repeat themselves in exactly the same form. Constantly changing conditions
dictate that there will always be mutations and variations in the form through
which class struggle is expressed. In Scotland today – in contrast to the 1970s
– the demand for national independence is strongest amongst those sections of
society who are more sympathetic to the cause of socialism. Empirical evidence
suggests that a majority of those who have backed Scottish Militant Labour and
the Scottish Socialist Alliance in elections are generally pro-independence. In
a confused and inchoate way, many young people especially see an independent
Scotland as the shortest and most obvious route to a new, fairer society.
Support for independence has become a touchstone of radicalism; it is seen as a
more revolutionary solution that anything on offer from the labour movement.
We also have to face up to the fact that there are powerful illusions in the
idea that an independent Scotland in and of itself would be more prosperous – or
at least would be more egalitarian, with a more progressive taxation system,
with more resources ploughed into public services, welfare, etc.
Certainly there is a growing contradiction between the social programme and
the economic programme of the SNP. The party’s social programme promises
substantial reforms, including the restoration of benefits to 16 and 17 year
olds, a £4.50 minimum wage, higher pensions, higher social welfare benefits, the
restoration of free education and large scale investment in housing and public
services.
Yet the economic programme of the SNP is for a free market capitalist
Scotland modelled on the Republic of Ireland complete with low rates of
corporation tax to attract inward investment. In practice, the economic
programme and the social programme of the SNP are incompatible. Like the Labour
government of 1974-79, an SNP government in the future would inevitably be
forced to abandon its programme of social reforms. Although North Sea oil would
act as a cushion, it is likely that an independent Scotland under a free market
capitalist SNP government would immediately run into serious economic problems.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that any political recoil against the
economic failure of an independent capitalist Scotland would lead to any serious
movement in favour of reconstituting the Union. It is more likely that such a
backlash against an SNP government would develop in a leftward direction and
lead to a massive strengthening of the forces of genuine socialism. In that
sense, even a capitalist independent Scotland would mark a step forward in the
overall movement towards socialism; at the very least it would help dispel any
illusions that Scotland’s problems could be solved simply by swapping a British
capitalist government for a Scottish capitalist government. It would help to
clear the path for the victory of genuine socialism in Scotland, which would
immediately have tremendous repercussions in England, Wales, Ireland and across
Europe.
With New Labour in power in Westminster, the trend towards independence is
likely to continue and deepen. However, socialist should never rule anything
out. If at some stage in the future, the idea of national independence is
superseded by a bigger move towards the idea of a socialist Britain, it would be
necessary to further revise our policy on the national question to take into
account changed circumstances. But at the same time, it is necessary to attempt
to point out the most likely course of future events and take these perspectives
into account when we are formulating our programme.
Why is it necessary now to put forward a more precise policy on independence?
Why does an open-ended policy no longer suffice? In politics timing can be
decisive. Sometimes it is necessary to check that there is water in the pool
before diving in. On the other hand, if you’re involved in a race, it’s fatal to
stand shivering at the side wondering how shallow the water is.
For several years, we have maintained in effect a neutral position towards
independence, neither for nor against. For a temporary period, that is an
acceptable position, particularly when the issue is merely bubbling below the
surface rather than boiling over. But we cannot maintain such a position
indefinitely. Even now, our policy on independence can appear like an evasion.
And, as debate on the issue begins to heat up, we will be seriously handicapped
unless we produce a much more clear-cut policy on independence.
Some sections of the left will hide behind demagogic arguments about the
"real issues facing the working class" in order to avoid taking a position. But
they will be seriously mistaken. It is true that most working class people are
more interested in the bread and butter issues of unemployment, the state of the
NHS, tuition fees, damp housing, etc, than about more abstract constitutional
questions. That is borne out by opinion polls which ask people which issues most
concern them. However, it is important to differentiate between problems and
solutions. When asked what issues concern them, people will naturally catalogue
their problems and grievances. But if the question is posed in a different way –
for example, "What do you see as the solution to these problems?" – the
importance of the national question becomes more clearly apparent. Faced with
such a question, a minority may be prepared to talk about socialism or a more
equal society. A much greater number, however, would advocate independence as a
solution to their problems.
In common with the Tories, some sections of the left subscribed to the
illusion that only the so-called "chattering classes" were concerned with
Scotland’s constitutional future. The outcome of the referendum – and the higher
than expected turnout – should serve as a warning to socialists never to
underestimate the national question.
The SNP has carefully drawn up a strategy to expose the inadequacies of
Labour’s devolved parliament by specifically zooming in on those powers that it
does not possess – and exploiting these limitations to heighten the demand for
independence. Three issues that are likely to be used by the SNP to demonstrate
the superiority of independence over devolution are Trident, benefits and the
minimum wage. On all three issues, the SNP will denounce the Labour government
for trampling on Scottish public opinion. And they will hammer home the message
that only an independent parliament would have the power to remove Trident from
the Clyde, or to reverse welfare cuts and restore benefits to 16 and 17 year
olds, or to implement a £4.50 minimum wage. The message that only an independent
parliament would have the powers to tackle the real problems facing Scotland
will find a powerful echo among working class people – and especially among
young people. In that situation, clarity is essential. If we are to make maximum
impact, it is essential to avoid equivocation on the issue of independence; or
an over-elaborate programme which cannot easily be grasped; or clumsy slogans
which are not expressed in the everyday language of working class people.
That is not to say that we ignore the Scottish Parliament or simply denounce
it as a feeble talking shop. As we have outlined elsewhere, the parliament is
likely to have some important powers – including, for example, the power to
restore free education, to cancel the housing debt and to introduce a range of
progressive measures which would signify a direct challenge to the New Labour
government in Westminster. Along with others in the Scottish Socialist Alliance,
we are working on a detailed policy statement which we would then develop into a
socialist manifesto for the first elections to the parliament.
But is also necessary to formulate a more rounded-out socialist programme for
Scotland which would include demands for democratic ownership and control of
finance, industry, land and energy; opposition to nuclear weapons; defence of
the environment; opposition to globalisation, EMU and multi-national capitalism;
and a huge shift in wealth from the rich to the working class and the poor.
Clearly, in the age of globalisation and multi-national capitalism, such a
programme is unsustainable for any length of time within the borders of a small
country. Consequently, our demand for socialist independence has to be raised in
a bold, internationalist form; we should seek to popularise the message that an
independent Scotland should take the lead in an international battle against
multi-national capitalism.
Superficially, there may appear to be advantages in preserving our existing
ambiguous policy for a further period. But we do not have unlimited time. The
first elections to a Scottish Parliament will take place, according to the White
Paper, "in the first half of 1999". If we fail to take a decision at our
forthcoming conference, that could mean delaying any change until some time in
1999 – in other words, slap bang in the middle of elections to a Scottish
Parliament.
Moreover, because we will be standing on these elections as part of the wider
Scottish Socialist Alliance, it is not only a matter of discussing our politics
and slogans on the national question within our own ranks; it will be necessary
to continue the discussion through the structures of the Alliance itself, with
the aim of arriving at an agreed policy well before the 1999 Scottish
parliamentary elections. For these reasons, it is imperative that we act sooner
than later.
Clearly, it would be dishonest to pretend that this change does not represent
a significant new departure for our organisation. On the other hand, it is
almost a natural progression; a policy that has evolved over a decade or longer
in line with changing political conditions in Scotland.
